A denial of copies takes effect only if it is specific, document by document; the court’s duty to give reasons on each ground, by contrast, does not depend on it. So held Cass. no. 23969 of 23 July 2026, quashing and remitting for apparent reasoning.
Order no. 23969 of 23 July 2026 of the Fifth Civil Division of the Italian Court of Cassation (ECLI:IT:CASS:2026:23969CIV, deliberation of 26 June 2026) keeps apart two planes that are often confused in practice: the burden of specific challenge borne by the taxpayer, and the duty to give reasons borne by the court. A party who denies the conformity of copies must state how they differ from the originals; a court that finds service proved must state why. The decision is not final on the merits: the case continues before the Tax Court of Second Instance of Tuscany, differently constituted.
The taxpayer had challenged a third-party attachment based on fifteen tax demands, for tax claims of EUR 115,726.02, and the subsequent payment notice, arguing defects in the service of the underlying demands: delivery of the sealed envelope to a person other than the addressee, no proof of receipt of the informative registered letters, and service entrusted to a private postal operator. The second-instance court, by judgment no. 501/2022 filed on 1 April 2022, had dismissed the appeal. The appeal to the Court of Cassation (case no. 26506/2022) was allowed on the second ground alone; the first, third and fourth were dismissed and the fifth was absorbed.
The first ground, based on Articles 2712, 2718 and 2719 of the Italian Civil Code and Articles 214 and 215 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was dismissed. Article 2719 gives photographic copies of documents the same effect as certified copies in two alternative cases: where conformity with the original is certified by a competent public officer, or where it is not expressly denied. For the denial to take effect it must identify the elements suggesting that copy and original do not correspond, or deny that the original exists at all. A generic challenge, or a blanket reservation covering all the documents produced by the opposing party, produces no effect, and the document remains on the file with its evidential value.
Two practical qualifications carry weight in court. The first concerns timing: the denial must be raised in the first available pleading after the document is produced, otherwise it is out of time. The second concerns effect: denying a copy does not have the peremptory consequences of denying a privately signed document, because the court retains the power to establish conformity with the original by any other evidence, including by inference. A well-drafted denial opens the question; it does not close it.
The distinction that governs the whole reasoning runs across three planes, and it is worth setting them out separately. If the objection is that the copy filed in court differs from the original, the basis is Article 2719 of the Civil Code and the tool is the specific denial. If the objection is a defect in the service procedure – the recipient is not among the persons entitled to take delivery, a required notice is missing, the form of service used was not available – the nullity of service is raised by ordinary means. If, instead, the aim is to deny the truth of what the postal officer or the process server certifies as having occurred in their presence, that is the date, the place, the fact of delivery, the signature affixed in their presence – then proceedings to impugn the document as false under Articles 221 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure are required. One matter must be kept apart, because in practice it is confused with this one: the capacity claimed by the person taking the envelope – a cohabiting relative, a member of the household, a person authorised to collect – is not covered by that privileged status, since the officer merely records someone else’s statement; a presumption applies which may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary, and no proceedings to impugn the document as false are needed to challenge it. In tax litigation those proceedings are not decided by the tax court, which may not entertain the question even incidentally: the court, having assessed the relevance of the document, sets a time limit for bringing them before the ordinary court and stays the case (Article 39(1) of Legislative Decree 546/1992), with the delay that this entails. Against certifications that stand until impugned as false, even the most specific denial has no effect. Confusing the three planes is one of the errors that most often cost a sound ground.
The second ground was allowed. The Court held the reasoning under appeal to be merely apparent: it had confined itself to stating that “ample and detailed proof was given of service of the payment notices”, without examining the challenge concerning delivery to a person other than the addressee, or the one concerning the informative registered letters, or the one concerning service by a private postal operator. Reasoning is apparent where, though graphically present, it does not make the logical path followed perceptible (Cass., Joint Divisions, no. 22232 of 3 November 2016), falling below the constitutional minimum required by Article 111(6) of the Italian Constitution (Cass., Joint Divisions, no. 8053 of 7 April 2014).
The defect is raised under Article 360(1)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, for breach of Articles 132(2)(4) of that Code and 36(2)(4) of Legislative Decree 546/1992. Failure to rule under Article 112 is raised under the same head: what changes is not the vehicle but the paradigm. Reasoning is apparent where the court has decided the question but does not make its logical path perceptible; there is a failure to rule where the court has not addressed a claim or a defence at all. That is why, in the case decided, the third and fourth grounds – framed as a failure to rule on questions that the judgment had in fact decided, however poorly – were dismissed. Choosing the wrong paradigm costs the ground even where the substantive challenge is well founded.
Article 26 of Presidential Decree 602/1973 still applies: its content has been carried over into the consolidated act on tax payments and collection (Legislative Decree no. 33 of 24 March 2025), where the rules on service are now set out in Article 102 and apply from 1 January 2027, following the deferral made by Decree-Law 200/2025, converted by Law 26/2026. As this is a consolidation without substantive change, the model of service does not change: Article 102 reproduces direct dispatch of a registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt, the reference to Article 60 of Presidential Decree 600/1973 for the cases covered by Article 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the five-year retention duty. What changes is the formal reference to be cited, not the rule. Article 26 allows a tax demand to be served by direct dispatch of a registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt, in a sealed envelope, service being completed on the date shown on the acknowledgement signed by the addressee, by an authorised person or by the concierge. The Italian Constitutional Court held challenges to this simplified model unfounded in judgment no. 175 of 23 July 2018, and it extended the same assessment, by order no. 104 of 24 April 2019, to direct service by tax offices (Article 14 of Law 890/1982) and to service for local taxes (Article 1(161) of Law 296/2006); to the same effect, order no. 2 of 2020. Order no. 104 of 2019 also points to a remedy that practice tends to overlook: a person who, through no fault of their own, has had no actual knowledge of the document may apply for relief from the time bar under Article 153(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, in an extensive application that the Court grounds on Article 6 of Law 212/2000; it is for the trial court to assess the circumstantial evidence offered by the addressee.
The first point to establish is not the date but the form of service used: the same delivery may stand or fall depending on the rules under which service was effected. In direct service under Article 26, Law 890/1982 does not apply, and the case law of the Court of Cassation rules out any need for a subsequent informative registered letter where the envelope has been delivered at the address to a person entitled to take it: that dispatch is governed by the rules on the ordinary postal service and not by Law 890/1982 (most recently Cass., Fifth Division, order no. 21583 of 27 July 2025, citing Cass. no. 28872 of 12 November 2018 and Cass. no. 10037 of 10 April 2019). Where, on the other hand, service was effected under Law 890/1982, the opposite rule applies: Article 7(3) of that Law – as introduced by Decree-Law 248/2007, converted by Law 31/2008, which extended to delivery to another person the logic already stated by the Constitutional Court for deposit at the post office in judgment no. 346 of 1998 – requires notice of service whenever the item is not handed to the addressee in person.
The position on items held at the post office also needs to be delimited. For the case of temporary absence governed by Article 8 of Law 890/1982, the Joint Divisions have held, on a constitutionally oriented reading, that notice of deposit is required and that proof of completed service calls for the corresponding acknowledgement of receipt to be produced in court, proof of dispatch not being enough (judgment no. 10012 of 15 April 2021). Whether that principle extends to direct service under Article 26 is not, however, settled: a substantial line of authority applies only the postal regulations to that form of service and treats the item being held at the post office as sufficient. The dividing line, however, does not run between the two forms of service alone: within the simplified service under Article 26 the steps required where the envelope is not handed over in person also vary according to whether the addressee is temporarily or permanently untraceable, because Article 26(4) refers back to Article 60 of Presidential Decree 600/1973 (Cass., Sixth Division, order no. 28570 of 3 October 2022, which set the judgment aside precisely because the lower court had not established where delivery had been attempted). This is a difference to establish before framing the ground, not afterwards.
The postal channel, moreover, is not the whole field. For businesses and for professionals entered on professional registers, service is now generally made to the digital domicile: Article 26(2) allows it to be effected by the means and at the digital domiciles laid down by Article 60-ter of Presidential Decree 600/1973, and the points to check are different ones. That the address used was the one shown, on the date of dispatch, in the register applicable to that class of addressee – INI-PEC for businesses and professionals, INAD for individuals. That both receipts are produced, of acceptance and of delivery, rather than a printout of the message: for the addressee service is completed on the date of delivery stated in the receipt, and that is the date from which the sixty days for bringing an application run; to check instead whether the time limit under Article 25 was met, the relevant date is that of the acceptance receipt, because service is completed at different moments for sender and addressee. That, where the mailbox was full, a second attempt at delivery was made no earlier than seven days after the first; and that, if that attempt also failed, or the digital domicile was neither valid nor active, the document was filed electronically for businesses and professionals in the reserved area of the InfoCamere website, with the notice published by the second following day and for fifteen days, and with the registered letter giving notice that service has been effected: in that case service is completed, for the addressee, on the fifteenth day after publication.
As to private operators, the reservation in favour of the universal service provider, laid down by Article 4 of Legislative Decree 261/1999 for service by post under Law 890/1982, was repealed by Article 1(57)(b) of Law 124/2017 with effect from 10 September 2017; the requirements for the special individual licence were set by the Italian communications authority AGCom in decision no. 77/18/CONS of 20 February 2018. For service effected earlier, the Joint Divisions have classified service by an operator without a licence as a nullity rather than non-existent, and therefore capable of being cured (judgment no. 299 of 10 January 2020). Here too, however, the challenge presupposes that service was effected under Law 890/1982: where it was effected directly under Article 26, by ordinary registered letter, the postal reservation is not engaged. Once the form of service is established, the second fact to check is the date of each individual service.
A defect in service must be handled with an eye to what it actually produces. Where service is void, challenging the act cures the defect by attainment of purpose: the defect retains value only where a time bar has meanwhile accrued, that is, where valid service never took place within the mandatory time limits laid down by Article 25 of Presidential Decree 602/1973. Those limits are 31 December of the third year following the year in which the return was filed – or the year in which the single or final instalment fell due, where the payment deadline for the sums shown in the return falls after 31 December of the year of filing – for sums due after the automated check under Article 36-bis of Presidential Decree 600/1973; of the fourth year, for the formal check under Article 36-ter; of the second year following the year in which the assessment became final; and of the third year following the last instalment where an instalment plan has lapsed. It is against those dates, and nowhere else, that the value of a defect in service is measured. For local taxes the limit is a different one: Article 1(163) of Law 296/2006 requires the enforcement title to be served, on pain of forfeiture, by 31 December of the third year following the year in which the assessment became final. Where service of the underlying document was omitted altogether, there is nothing to cure, and the choice, which the Joint Divisions recognise as the taxpayer’s – and which must be stated in the application, because the court is bound by the claim as framed –, is between challenging only the consequential act for the procedural defect, remaining exposed to fresh action by the authority while the time limits are open, and challenging both acts together, contesting the merits of the claim as well. That is why, alongside the defect in service, limitation of the claim is regularly pleaded as well: an unchallenged tax demand becomes final but does not acquire the force of a judgment, so there is no conversion into the ten-year period of the actio iudicati under Article 2953 of the Civil Code: the limitation period proper to each claim applies – five years for social security contributions, penalties and local taxes, ten years under Article 2946 of the Civil Code for State taxes on the prevailing view (Cass., Joint Divisions, no. 23397 of 17 November 2016). The Joint Divisions, to be exact, ruled only on Article 2953, leaving the rest to the limitation period proper to each claim: on the period applicable to State taxes the later case law of the ordinary divisions is not unanimous, and it should be checked when the application is drafted. Finally, the burden of proving valid service lies with the party asserting it, that is the authority and the collection agent, under the general rule in Article 2697 of the Civil Code and settled case law. Article 7(5-bis) of Legislative Decree 546/1992 confirms that approach as regards the facts constituting the claim, but its extension to procedural facts, and therefore to service, is not settled. In any event it is on that burden that a request for production of the acknowledgements of receipt rests.
First, the forum. For tax claims, a challenge to the absence or invalidity of service of the acts underlying an attachment belongs to the tax court and not to the enforcement court: so provide Article 2 of Legislative Decree 546/1992 and Article 57 of Presidential Decree 602/1973, following judgment no. 114 of 2018 of the Constitutional Court and Cass., Joint Divisions, no. 7822 of 14 April 2020. That same judgment no. 114 of 2018, however, opened to the ordinary court an application under Article 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure for facts extinguishing the claim after service of the demand; and since attachments by the collection agent are almost always mixed, with social security and penalty items alongside tax items, for the non-tax items the forum remains the ordinary court, the employment court or opposition under Law 689/1981.
The basis for the challenge is Article 19(3), last sentence, of Legislative Decree 546/1992: failure to serve independently appealable acts adopted before the act served allows them to be challenged together with the latter. And where a third-party attachment under Article 72-bis of Presidential Decree 602/1973 is already under way, an application to stay enforcement under Article 47 of Legislative Decree 546/1992 a stay of the act challenged should be sought: the reasoned request is made in the application itself or by a separate document served on the other parties and filed with the registry (Article 47(1) of Legislative Decree 546/1992), so it is available after filing as well. Where the prejudice is imminent, the president may be asked, in cases of exceptional urgency and after a preliminary view of the merits, for a reasoned order granting an interim stay until the panel or the single judge rules (Article 47(3)): it is the only protection that works within a timeframe compatible with an attachment already served on the third party.
A word of caution on the starting point. Obtaining an extract from the tax roll and challenging it is no longer enough: Article 12(4-bis) of Presidential Decree 602/1973 – introduced by Article 3-bis of Decree-Law 146/2021, converted by Law 215/2021 – provides that the extract from the tax roll cannot be challenged, and allows a direct challenge to the roll and to a demand alleged to have been invalidly served only where the debtor shows that entry on the roll may cause prejudice in one of the situations listed in the provision: public contracts, the collection of sums owed by public bodies, the loss of a benefit in dealings with a public authority, proceedings under the business crisis and insolvency code, financing transactions with authorised lenders, and the transfer of a business. The Joint Divisions have held that the provision applies to pending proceedings as well, because it gives concrete shape to the interest in bringing the claim, and have declared the constitutional challenges raised against it manifestly unfounded (judgment no. 26283 of 6 September 2022). Where the demand has been followed by a document that was actually served – a payment notice, an administrative hold, a mortgage charge, an attachment – the question does not arise: it is that document that is challenged, pleading the defective service of the underlying one.
Before filing, counsel should ask the collection agent in writing to produce the counterfoil or a copy of each demand together with the certificate of service or the acknowledgement of receipt: Article 26(5) of Presidential Decree 602/1973 requires these to be kept for five years and produced at the taxpayer’s request. The request should be kept with proof of dispatch, but it suspends nothing: the sixty days for bringing an application against the first act of which the taxpayer has notice (Article 21 of Legislative Decree 546/1992) run in any event, and the application must be brought within that period – which is suspended from 1 to 31 August under Article 1 of Law 742/1969 – and then filed with the court within the thirty days set by Article 22, seeking production in the proceedings if necessary. Note also that the expiry of the five-year period does not relieve the collection agent of the burden of proving service, and that failure to comply with the duty to produce does not in itself make the act void: it bears on the evidence.
Since the defect in service is coupled with a plea of limitation, which goes to the merits of the claim and not to the regularity of the collection agent’s acts, the application should also be served on the levying authority: the agent’s duty to join it to the proceedings (Article 39 of Legislative Decree 112/1999) does not shield the taxpayer from the outcome of the case.
In the application, the denial must be set out document by document, stating how the copy differs from the original; the challenge to service must be built demand by demand, stating the date, the form of service used, the person effecting service, the capacity declared by the recipient and the outcome of any period during which the item was held at the post office, with an express request that the acknowledgements of receipt be produced. Where the defence aims to contradict what the public officer has certified, proceedings to impugn the document as false should be considered. In the proceedings after remittal it is worth filing a pleading listing each ground one by one: it is against that list that the adequacy of the reasoning will be measured on any further appeal.
The tax demand was handed to a family member: is service valid?
It depends on the form of service. In direct service by the collection agent under Article 26 of Presidential Decree 602/1973, delivery at the address to a person entitled to take it completes service and no informative registered letter is required. Where service was effected under Law 890/1982, notice of service is required whenever the item is not handed to the addressee in person. The first thing to establish, therefore, is not who signed, but under which rules service was effected. And if the person who took the envelope claimed a capacity they did not have – a cohabitant who did not live there, an employee who did not work there – that statement is challenged by evidence to the contrary, with no need to impugn the document as false: a historical residence certificate, a family status certificate as at the date of delivery, records of the employment relationship.
The collection agent no longer holds the demand served ten years ago: is service to be treated as proved?
No. The five-year duty of retention under Article 26(5) of Presidential Decree 602/1973 concerns retention and production, but its expiry does not shift the burden of proof, which stays with the party claiming to have effected service (under the general rule in Article 2697 of the Civil Code. Inability to produce the documents bears on the evidence, not on the validity of the act.
What is the difference between denying a copy and challenging service?
They are two distinct planes, to which a third must be added. Denying a copy means asserting, with specific particulars, that the document filed does not correspond to the original (Article 2719 of the Civil Code). Challenging service means raising a defect in the procedure, for example delivery to a person not entitled to take it or the absence of a required notice. Denying the truth of what the public officer certifies as having occurred in their presence – the date, the place, the fact of delivery, the signature affixed in their presence – instead requires proceedings to impugn the document as false, brought before the ordinary court and entailing a stay of the tax proceedings (Article 39(1) of Legislative Decree 546/1992): neither the denial nor an ordinary challenge will do. The capacity claimed by the person who took the envelope is another matter: it is not covered by privileged status and is challenged by evidence to the contrary, with no need to impugn the document as false.
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